Introduction
Incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics have usually been analysed under the assumption that either the type set is …nite or the type set is an interval and the type distribution has a continuous, strictly positive density. These assumptions permit the application of standard optimization techniques, calculus if the type set is …nite, control theory if the type set is a continuum.
Both assumptions are special. In the space of distributions on the real line, distributions with …nite supports and distributions with positive densities form a meager set. These distributions have the special property that the weights given to di¤erent types are commensurate in the sense that no one type is in…nitely more important than any other type. This commensurateness property For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Christoph Engel, Alia Gizatulina, Hendrik Hakenes, and Klaus Ritzberger, as well as a Co-Editor and three referees. 1 has played an important role in the analysis of such problems. It is therefore of interest to know to what extent the results and insights that have been obtained remain valid when commensurateness fails, in particular, when the type distribution has both mass points and a continuous part, so that some types (the mass points) are in…nitely more important than others (the points at which the distribution has a positive density).
As an example, consider the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation. In this theory, the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax for all but the very highest types is usually explained in terms of a local equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤: 1 If, for some type, the marginal income tax were zero, then this type's labour-consumption pair would be e¢ cient. At the margin, therefore, the e¢ -ciency loss induced by a small reduction of this type's labour and consumption would be negligible relative to the gains from the additional redistribution from higher types to lower types that is made possible by the induced slackening of incentive constraints for the higher types. This argument presumes that the di¤erent types are commensurate. If the type under consideration was a mass point of the type distribution, it would be "in…nitely" more important than immediately adjacent higher types that are continuity points of the type distribution. Therefore, one could not presume that the e¢ ciency loss induced by a small reduction of this type's labour and consumption is negligible relative to the gains from the additional redistribution. 2 Commensurateness of neighbouring types is also presumed in elasticities interpretations of optimal income tax formulae in models with a continuum of types. 3 The analysis of incentive problems with arbitrary type distributions requires a new technique. This paper develops such a technique and uses it to provide a complete characterization of optimal contracts in a principal-agent problem with unidimensional hidden characteristics, with a single-crossing condition on preferences, when no restriction is imposed on the type distribution. The principal-agent problem is chosen because its simplicity facilitates the exposition. The new technique can, however, be applied to any incentive problem with unidimensional hidden characteristics and with a single-crossing condition on preferences. In particular, it can be applied to the optimal income tax problem. 1. First, any mass point below the top of the type set must be pooled with adjacent higher types. Second, a mass point between the top and the bottom of the type set is likely to give rise to a discontinuity in the mapping from types to outcomes. 5 Both …ndings are due to the lack of commensurateness between the mass point and any adjacent higher or lower types that are continuity points of the type distribution. In terms of local tradeo¤s between allocative and distributive concerns, e.g. the equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤ that is discussed in the literature on optimal income taxation, the di¤erence in relative weights given to a mass point and to adjacent continuity points of the type distribution implies that, at the mass point, e¢ ciency concerns are much more important than at adjacent continuity points of the type distribution. In an income tax model, this would suggest that the mass point should work signi…cantly more and consume signi…cantly more than the neighbouring types. With preferences satisfying a single-crossing condition, however, outcomes must be nondecreasing in types. Therefore, there cannot be a downward jump above the mass point. Instead, the monotonicity constraint is binding, and there is pooling of the mass point with adjacent higher types. By contrast, monotonicity does not preclude an upward jump as one moves from adjacent lower types to the mass point. 6 The paper also considers those properties of optimal incentive schemes that have been discussed in the literature. Regardless of the structure of the type distribution, optimal incentive schemes involve no distortion "at the top" and downward distortions "below the top" of the type distribution. In the more general setting of this paper, the latter result requires a new argument. Whereas the desirability of downward distortions "below the top" has traditionally been derived from tradeo¤s imposed by the …rst-order conditions for incentive compatibility, at a mass point of the type distribution, the argument must rely on the second-order conditions. As explained above, the lack of commensurateness between a mass point and adjacent higher or lower continuity points of the type distribution implies that monotonicity conditions, i.e., second-order conditions for incentive compatibility are binding. The mass point must be pooled with adjacent higher types, and the analysis must show that, for all types in the pool, outcomes are distorted downwards from e¢ ciency.
The paper builds on two technical innovations. First, for an arbitrary model with unidimensional hidden characteristics, a change of variables can be used to rede…ne the notion of "type" in such a way that the original incentive problem is transformed into a new one, where the distribution of the "rede…ned types" has a density. This density need not be continuous. However, from Clarke's (1976 Clarke's ( , 1983 ) version of the maximum principle under minimal hypotheses, we know that this is not a problem. The application of control theoretic methods does not require continuity of the Hamiltonian with respect to the exogenous parameter, i.e., the agent's type. It is important, however, to verify that the change of variables have no marterial e¤ect on the solution to the incentive problem under consideration.
Second, for control problems with monotonicity constraints, a version of the maximum principle holds even if the map from types to outcomes is not continuous. According to this result, which is established in , one may think of the "slope" of the map from types to outcomes as a control variable even though this map may have a nontrivial singular component, and its "slope" may be unbounded. The maximum principle requires that, regardless of whether this "slope" is …nite or in…nite, it should not be possible to raise the value of the Hamiltonian by changing it. Thus, whenever the map from types to outcomes is strictly increasing, the associated costate variable must be zero.
Previous work on incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics has assumed that the map from types to outcomes is piecewise continuously di¤erentiable. This assumption facilitates the control theoretic treatment of monotonicity constraints. With piecewise continuous di¤erentiability, the slope of the map from types to outcomes can be treated as a control variable; monotonicity of outcomes is equivalent to requiring this control variable to take nonnegative values. 7 Because the map from types to outcomes is endogenous, however, the assumption of piecewise continuous di¤erentiability is problematic. The technique developed in this paper provides a way of doing without it.
The generalization of the analysis to allow for type distributions with mass 7 This approach was pioneered by Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984) .
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points as well as a continuous part is not just a matter of mathematical generality. Such type distributions arise naturally in quasi-linear models in which the agent can get information about his type before he signs a contract. In such models, being uninformed is equivalent to having a type equal to the mean of the type distribution. Thus, if there is a positive probability that the agent does not learn his type at all, then, from the principal's perspective, the contracting problem can be treated as an incentive problem with hidden characteristics in which the type distribution has a mass point at its mean. 8 In the following, Section 2 formulates the agency problem with hidden characteristics and states the main results. Section 3 uses a change of variables in order to make the problem amenable to control theoretic methods. Section 4 uses the maximum principle for control problems with monotonicity constraints to characterize the solutions to the agency problem and prove the main results.
2 A Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Characteristics
Statement of the Problem
A principal wants an agent to produce some output y 0 in return for a wage payment w 0: The payo¤s from the pair (w; y) are y w for the principal and u(w; y; t) for the agent, where t 2 R is a productivity parameter. The function u is assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable, nondecreasing in w and t, nonincreasing in y; and strictly quasi-concave in w and y jointly. The agent's utility function also satis…es u(0; 0; t) = 0 for all t; lim y!0 u y (w; y; t) = 0 and lim y!1 u y (w; y; t) = 1; uniformly in w; for all t; as well as u w (w; y; t) > 0; u y (w; y; t) < 0; (2.1) and @ @t ju y (w; y; t)j u w (w; y; t) 0 (2.2) for all w > 0; y > 0; and t: 9 The single-crossing condition (2.2) is imposed as a weak, rather than a strict inequality.
The principal is assumed to have all the bargaining power. If he o¤ers the agent a contract (w; y), the agent can only accept or reject this o¤er. The agent's payo¤ from rejecting the principal's o¤er is zero. Thus, under complete information, the principal would hire the agent at a wage that just compensates him for the disutility from working, without letting him share in the surplus from production.
However, there is incomplete information: Whereas the agent knows t; the principal thinks of t as the realization of a random variablet, to which he attributes a probability distribution F: The support T of the distribution F is assumed to be compact, with minimum t 0 and maximum t 1 :
Given his lack of information, the principal o¤ers a menu of contracts and lets the agent choose a contract from the menu or reject the principal's o¤er altogether. A contract menu is a pair (w( ); y( )) of integrable functions on T such that, for any t 2 T; (w(t); y(t)) is the contract, i.e., the wage/output combination that is chosen by the agent when his productivity parameter is t: The principal's problem is to choose the contract menu (w( ); y( )) so that his expected net payo¤,
is maximized subject to the incentive compatibility condition that
for all t and t 0 in T; and subject to the individual-rationality condition that u(w(t); y(t); t) 0 (IR) for all t in T: 10 A contract menu that satis…es the incentive compatibility and individual-rationality conditions is said to be admissible. A contract menu that maximizes the principal's expected net payo¤ (2.3) subject to the incentive compatibility and individual-rationality conditions is said to be optimal.
Distortions in Optimal Contracts
Conceptually, the principal's problem is a standard incentive problem with hidden characteristics. Textbook treatments are provided by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), or La¤ont and Martimort (2001) under the assumptions that T is a …nite set or that T is an interval and F has a density that is strictly positive and continuous on T . Here, I only assume that T is compact.
Let (w( ); y( )) be an optimal contract menu and let
1 0 Condition IR presumes that the principal does not prefer to make an o¤er which, for some t; the agent wants to reject. This presumption involves no loss of generality: Under the given assumptions, a contract menu (w( ); y( )) with the property that, for some t 2 T; the agent rejects the principal's o¤er is payo¤-equivalent to the contract menu that is obtained if, for the rejecting types, the contract o¤ers (w(t); y(t)) are replaced by (0; 0); this latter contract menu satis…es the participation constraint IR for all t.
6 be the associated indirect utility function for the agent. To assess the e¢ -ciency properties of (w(t); y(t)); the literature compares (w(t); y(t)) to the pair (w (t; v(t)); y (t; v(t))) that provides the person with productivity parameter t with the utility v(t) at the lowest net resource cost; formally, for any t and v; (w (t; v); y (t; v)) = arg max y 0;w 0 fy wju(w; y; n) vg:
The pair (w (t; v); y (t; v)) is fully characterized by the …rst-order condition u w (w (t; v); y (t; v); t) + u y (w (t; v); y (t; v); t) = 0: (2.6)
In those cases that have been treated in the literature, the optimal (w( ); y( )) and v( ) have been shown to exhibit the following properties.
Property A There is no distortion at the top:
for any sequence ft k g in T that converges to t 1 from below.
Property B There are downward distortions below the top:
(w(t); y(t)) (w (t; v(t)); y (t; v(t))):
The following theorem extends the results in the literature to the more general setting considered here. Some care must be taken with the formulation because the choice of an optimal contract menu involves a certain arbitrariness, due to the fact that the principal's objective function (2.3) is unchanged if the contract menu (w( ); y( )) is modi…ed on a set of probability zero. The arbitrariness is inessential, however, because the joint distribution of wage/output combinations and types is una¤ected by such a modi…cation. I will say that two contract menus (w( ); y( )) and (w 0 ( ); y 0 ( )) are equivalent if (w(t); y(t)) = (w 0 (t); y 0 (t)) for F -almost all t: Two contract menus (w( ); y( )) and (w 0 ( ); y 0 ( )) are said to be strongly equivalent if they are equivalent and, in addition, u(w(t); y(t); t) = u(w 0 (t); y 0 (t); t) for all t; i.e., they yield the same payo¤ to every type of the agent. Theorem 2.1 For any optimal contract menu (w( ); y( )); with associated indirect utility function v( ) for the agent, there exists a strongly equivalent contract menu ( w( ); y( )) (which is also optimal) and there existst 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ] such that ( w( ); y( )) is nondecreasing and, moreover, the following hold:
( w(t); y(t)) = (w (t; v(t)); y (t; v(t))) = ( w(t 1 ); y(t 1 )) (2.10) For utility functions satisfying the single-crossing condition (2.2) with a strict inequality, Corollary 2.2 shows that, regardless of the form of the type distribution, optimal contract menus must have Properties A and B, no distortion at the top and downward distortions below the top of the type distribution. If the single-crossing condition (2.2) holds only as a weak inequality, optimal contract menus need not literally have Properties A and B. In this case, however, one still gets a decomposition of the type set into an upper part, T \ [t; t 1 ]; where the optimal contract is e¢ cient, and a lower part, T \ [t 0 ;t); where the optimal contract is distorted downwards from e¢ ciency. We still have no distortion at the top, but "the top" now can be an entire interval [t; t 1 ]: If this is the case, then, by statement (a.1) of the theorem, the contract ( w(t); y(t)) is the same for all t in the interval [t; t 1 ]: Because this contract is e¢ cient for all these types, the single-crossing condition (2.2) must locally hold as an equation, i.e., one must have @ @t ju y (w; y; t)j u w (w; y; t) (w (t 1 ; v(t 1 )); y (t 1 ; v(t 1 )); t) = 0 (2.13) for all t 2 [t; t 1 ]: Conversely, if, locally, at (w (t 1 ; v(t 1 )); y (t 1 ; v(t 1 )); t); the single-crossing condition (2.2) is strict, one must havet = t 1 ; so that the optimal contract menu satis…es Properties A and B as speci…ed. The corollary makes this converse explicit. Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.2 provide a positive answer to the question, which has been raised in the literature on optimal taxation, 11 whether Property A holds if the type distribution has a density and the value of the density "at the top" is equal to zero. There is no need to assume that the density is strictly positive at t 1 . To understand the underlying logic, consider the case where F has a continuous density f and u takes the form u(w; y; t) = w ( y t ); (2.14) which was used by Mirrlees (1971) . If a …rst-order approach to incentive compatibility is valid, an optimal contract menu must satisfy the optimality condition f (t)(1 + u y ( w(t); y(t); t)) = (1 F (t))u yt ( w(t); y(t); t); (2.15)
i.e.,
For any sequence ft k g that converges to t 1 from below, the ratio
converges to zero. 12 Along such a sequence, therefore,
) must converge to one, i.e., the wedge distorting the output level of type t k vanishes. If one cannot just rely on a …rst-order approach, the argument is more complicated, but the economic logic is the same: Near t 1 ; distortions are kept small because the ratio
of the weight of the set of types above t from whom the principal can extract more rents as a result of a distortion at t and the density of the type t that is a¤ected by the distortion is close to zero. As t converges to t 1 , therefore, the tradeo¤ between the e¢ ciency loss and the rent extraction gain from the distortion at t becomes degenerate.
A referee has commented that Property A depends on the assumption that t 1 is known and …nite. If t 1 = 1 and F (ft 1 g) = 0; the e¢ cient pair in (2.8) is not well de…ned, but, in the formulation of Property A, (2.8) can be replaced by the requirement that lim t"t1 ju y ( w(t); y(t); t)j u w ( w(t); y(t); t) = 1:
Condition (2.17) is equivalent to (2.8) if t 1 < 1 and can also be applied when t 1 = 1: However, with t 1 = 1; the ratio
need not go to zero as t becomes large. Adapting an example of Diamond (1998) , suppose that, above some threshold, F is a Pareto distribution, i.e., 1 F (t) = t for some > 0; so that the ratio
t goes out of bounds with t. If u takes the form (2.14)
with ( y t ) = ( y t ) q for some q > 1; (2.16) can be shown to imply
For the given utility speci…cation, the marginal rate of substitution juy( w(t); y(t);t)j uw( w(t); y(t);t)
is just equal to the term
on the left-hand side. Condition (2.18) requires this term to be constant and less than one, which is incompatible with (2.17) . In this case, Property A does not hold. 1 2 Because 1 F (t 1 ) = 0; this claim is trivial if f (t 1 ) > 0: More generally, 1 F (t 1 ) = 0 implies lim t"t 1 ln(1 F (t)) = 1: Therefore, lim t"t 1 d dt ln(1 F (t)) = 1 and, hence,
The crucial di¤erence between this example and Theorem 2.1 is in the behaviour of the ratio
when t converges to t 1 . In the example, this ratio goes out of bounds, in the setting of Theorem 2.1, with a compact type set, it necessarily goes to zero as t converges to t 1 :For the utility speci…cation (2.14), the arguments of Werning (2007) imply that, even with t 1 = 1, Property A, with (2.17) replacing (2.8), is obtained if
tf (t) goes to zero as t ! 1 and if the relative curvature 00 y t 0 of the e¤ort cost function is bounded: I conjecture that this is generally true whenever uyt uy is uniformly bounded and
goes to zero as t becomes large. Property A is properly understood as the statement that, near the top of the type distribution, the tradeo¤ between distributive and allocative concerns is degenerate if the ratio
f (t) is close to zero. Relative to the density of the type t that is a¤ected by a distortion at t; the weight of the set of types above t from whom the principal can extract more rents as a result of the distortion at t is close to zero. Therefore, it is undesirable to have any signi…cant distortion.
Mass Points, Pooling and Discontinuities in Optimal Contract Menus
The following results establish some additional properties of optimal contract menus. These properties arise only when the type distribution has both mass points and a continuous part.
Theorem 2.3
Let (w( ); y( )) be any optimal contract menu, and let ( w( ); y( )) andt 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ] be the associated strongly equivalent contract menu and critical type as given by Theorem 2.1. If F (ftg) > 0 for some t 2 [t 0 ;t); there exists t 2 (t;t] such that, on the interval [t; t); the functions w( ); y( ); and y( ) w( ) are constant; in particular, if F ((t; t)) > 0; the menus (w( ); y( )) and ( w( ); y( )) both provide for pooling of type t with adjacent higher types.
The rationale for this result has been sketched in the introduction: If there was no pooling with higher types, the usual tradeo¤ between the distributive e¤ects and the allocative e¤ects of a downward distortion in the contract ( w(t); y(t)) for a type t that has positive mass would be degenerate. Type t would be deemed to have so much weight that a distortion in ( w(t); y(t)); away from e¢ ciency, would seem undesirable. However, for a type t 0 just above t that does not have positive mass, standard arguments imply that the contract ( w(t 0 ); y(t 0 )) is distorted downward from e¢ ciency. The resulting contract menu though, with an e¢ cient outcome for t and a downward distortion for t 0 > t would be decreasing and would violate incentive compatibility. The assumption that type t is not pooled with higher types thus leads to a contradiction.
By contrast, the monotonicity requirement does not preclude upward jumps in the optimal contract menu. The observation that a mass point is incommensurately more important than any continuity point of the type distribution implies that, as one moves from immediately adjacent lower types to the mass point, the weights given to losses from distortions of e¢ ciency and to gains from alleviating incentive constraints change discontinuously. As illustrated in Figure  1 in the introduction, this induces an upward jump in the contract menu.
Proposition 2.4 Assume that, for any w and y; the function t ! ln juy(w;y;t)j uw(w;y;t) is convex. 13 Assume also that the density f a of the absolutely continuous component F a of the type distribution F is strictly positive and nondecreasing on
Let (w( ); y( )) be any optimal contract menu, and let ( w( ); y( )) andt 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ] be the associated strongly equivalent contract menu and critical type as given by Theorem 2.1. If F (ftg) > 0 for some t 2 [t 0 ;t), consider the lowest type that gets the same outcome as t, i.e.,
If t > 0; the contract menu w( ) and y( ) is discontinuous at t . If t > 0 and F ((t ;t )) > 0 for all > 0; the contract menu (w( ); y( )) is also discontinuous at t .
In Proposition 2.4, the additional assumptions, log-convexity of juy(w;y;t)j uw(w;y;t) in t and monotonicity of the density f a ; are introduced to eliminate the possibility that the mass point might belong to the interior of an ironing interval à la Guesnerie-La¤ont (1984) . Such an interval would provide for a pooling of types even when the type distribution has a continuous density. The additional assumptions imply that the contracts o¤ered to higher types necessarily involve strictly greater outcomes then the contracts o¤ered to lower unless the higher types are pooled with mass points. Without mass points, these additional assumptions imply that there is no pooling. This is formally stated as: Proposition 2.5 Assume that, for any w and y; the function t ! ln juy(w;y;t)j uw(w;y;t) is convex. Assume also that the type distribution has a density, and that this density is strictly positive and nondecreasing on [t 0 ; t 1 ].
If (w( ); y( )) is any optimal contract menu, and if ( w( ); y( )) is the associated strongly equivalent contract menu and critical type as given by Theorem 2.1, then both menus (w( ); y( )) and ( w( ); y( )) are strictly increasing on [t 0 ;t] wheret is the critical type above which outcomes involve no distortion away from e¢ ciency.
Whereas log-convexity of juy(w;y;t)j uw(w;y;t) in t and monotonicity of the density provide for monotonicity of optimal contract menus, continuity requires a di¤erent set of assumptions. Adapting an argument of Mirrlees (1986, pp. 1231 f.), one obtains Proposition 2.6 Assume that, for any v and t; the function y ! u t (c(v; y; t); y; t) is convex, where c(v; y; t) is de…ned so that u(c(v; y; t); y; t) = v for any v; y; t: If the type distribution has a continuous density, any optimal contract menu is continuous.
Convexity of the function y ! u t (c(v; y; t); y; t) is implied by convexity of the function (v; y) ! u t (c(v; y; t); y; t): As discussed in Hellwig (2004 , this latter condition is equivalent to the assumption that consumption-speci…c risk aversion be weakly decreasing in t; i.e., that for any random pair (w;ỹ) the amount of consumption that the agent is willing to sacri…ce in order to eliminate the uncertainty in (w;ỹ) be nonincreasing in t: This assumption also implies that, up to equivalence, the optimal contract menu is unique. Moreover, the optimal deterministic contract menu remains optimal if randomization is allowed; randomization is undesirable.
Three Preliminary Lemmas
The remainder of the paper provides formal proofs of the theorems and propositions. I begin by stating three lemmas that allow me to replace incentive compatibility and individual-rationality constraints by analytically tractable conditions on the indirect utility function v( ) and by a monotonicity condition on outcomes, along the lines of . These lemmas are proved in the online Appendix.
The …rst result shows that, even if the support of the type distribution is a strict subset of the interval [t 0 ; t 1 ]; one can always formulate the principal's problem in terms of contract menus that are de…ned on the interval [t 0 ; t 1 ]: Refer to a contract menu with domain X as incentive-compatible on X if condition IC holds for all t and t 0 in X; refer to it as individually rational on X if condition IR holds for all t in X: Then one obtains: Lemma 2.7 A contract menu (w( ); y( )) that is de…ned on T [t 0 ; t 1 ] is incentive-compatible and individually rational on T if and only if there exists an extension of (w( ); y( )) to the interval [t 0 ; t 1 ] that is incentive-compatible and individually rational on [t 0 ; t 1 ]:
This lemma implies that there is no loss of generality in assuming that all contract menus are de…ned on the interval [t 0 ; t 1 ] and have to satisfy incentive compatibility and individual-rationality conditions on this interval. For t 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ]nT , contracts (w(t); y(t)) can always be chosen so that conditions IC and IR hold. Incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality requirements for such types do not add materially to the principal's constraints. These types' contracts are of course irrelevant for the principal's payo¤ expectations.
For contract menus that are de…ned on [t 0 ; t 1 ]; the arguments of are easily adapted to yield the following characterization of incentive compatibility.
Lemma 2.8 A nondecreasing contract menu (w( ); y( )) is incentive-compatible and individually rational on [t 0 ; t 1 ] if and only if the induced indirect utility function v( ) satis…es the integral equation
In Lemma 2.8, weak monotonicity of the contract menu is assumed. Under a strict single-crossing condition, weak monotonicity is in fact known to be necessary for incentive compatibility. Here, with only a weak single-crossing condition, this is not the case. However, with strictly convex indi¤erence curves of the agent, the principal does not want to implement a non-monotonic contract menu.
14 This is the point of the following lemma.
Lemma 2.9 For any incentive-compatible contract menu (w( ); y( )), there exists a nondecreasing incentive-compatible contract menu ( w( ); y( )) that provides the agent with the same payo¤ v(t) = u(w(t); y(t); t) for all t and that satis…es
moreover, the inequality in (2.21) is strict unless the contract menus (w( ); y( )) and ( w( ); y( )) are equivalent.
A Reformulation of the Principal' s Problem
Lemmas 2.7 -2.8 imply that the principal's problem is equivalent to the problem of choosing w( ); y( ); and v( ) so as to maximize (2.3) under the constraints that y( ) be nondecreasing and that v( ) = u(w( ); y( ); ) satisfy the integral equation (2.19) and the boundary condition (2.20) . With a slight abuse of language, I will refer to this problem also as the principal's problem. The integral equation (2.19 ) is equivalent to the requirement that v( ) be absolutely continuous, with Radon-Nikodym derivative
for almost all t: One is therefore tempted to treat the principal's problem as a problem of optimal control with state variable v and control variables w and y: This would be the natural way to proceed if y( ) wasn't required to be nondecreasing and if F had a density. Here, however, a direct application of control theoretic methods is precluded by the monotonicity requirement on y( ) and the lack of any structure on F . I will therefore reformulate the principal's problem so as to circumvent these di¢ culties. 1 4 The logic is the same as in Figure 2 below.
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For this purpose, I change the variable of integration in (2.3), using a new variable x; rather than t; as the argument of the functions that are to be chosen. In a sense, this amounts to a rede…nition of the notion of "type". The new "pseudotype" is constructed so that its distribution has a density. This density, however, need not be continuous.
For any t 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ]; set (t) := t + F (t):
The function is strictly increasing and has an inverse = 1 : The inverse is de…ned on the range of ; a subset of the interval [x 0 ; x 1 ] := [t 0 ; t 1 +1]: Using the fact that F ( ) and therefore also ( ) is right-continuous, as well as increasing, one can extend the inverse to the entire interval [x 0 ; x 1 ] by setting
If one setsx = (t); one hast = (x): The distribution ofx is G := F 1 ; and the distribution F oft satis…es
By the change-ofvariable formula, it follows that, for any function h on
The following lemma shows that G has a density so that (3.4) can actually be written in the form 
if, at t = (x), the derivative F 0 (t) = f (t) is well de…ned, and
otherwise. The distribution function G = F 1 is also absolutely continuous.
Proof. From (3.2), (3.3), and the de…nition of G; one has
for all x 2 [x 0 ; x 1 ]: Since ( ) and G( ) are both nondecreasing, it follows that both are Lipschitz continuous, hence absolutely continuous. Moreover, their slopes must add to one. For any x; (x + ) > (x ) for all > 0 implies
; which yields (3.6) if
is well de…ned and (3.7) if
Trivially, (3.7) holds also if (x + ) = (x ) for some > 0: For this case, (3.3) indicates that and F are discontinuous at t = (x + ) = (x ): The derivative F 0 (t) is then not well de…ned at t:
For any contract menu (w( ); y( )); (3.3) and (3.5) imply that the principal's payo¤ (2.3) can be rewritten as
Moreover, ifû is de…ned so that u(w; y; x) := u(w; y; (x)) (3.11)
for all w; y; x; (2.4), (2.19) , and (2.20) are equivalent to the conditions
and v( (t 0 )) 0: (3.14)
Now (3.10) -(3.14) can be rewritten as
Consider the problem of maximizing (3.15) under the constraints thatŷ( ) be nondecreasing and thatv( ) satisfy (3.16) -(3.18). For lack of a better term, I call this the principal's modi…ed problem. The following proposition shows that this problem is actually equivalent to the principal's problem. Proof. The principal's problem has been shown to be equivalent to the problem of choosing w( ); y( ); and v( ) so as to maximize (3.10) under the constraints that y( ) be nondecreasing and that v( ) satisfy conditions (3.11) -(3.14). This problem is equivalent to the problem of choosing functionsŵ( );ŷ( ); and v( ) to maximize (3.15) under the constraints thatŷ( ) be nondecreasing, that v( ) satisfy (3.16) -(3.18), withû given by (3.11), and under the constraint thatŵ( );ŷ( ); andv( ) can be represented in the form (3.19) for some functions w( ); y( ); and v( ): This latter problem is the same as the principal's modi…ed problem with the added constraintŵ( );ŷ( ); andv( ) take the form (3.19) for some functions w( ); y( ); and v( ): To prove the proposition, it is therefore su¢ cient to show that the added constraint is redundant because, up to modi…cations on null sets, any solutionŵ;ŷ;v to the principal's modi…ed problem satis…es (3.19) for some functions w; y; v:
For this purpose, I will show that, for almost all x 1 and x 2 ; (x 1 ) = (x 2 ) impliesŵ(x 1 ) =ŵ(x 2 );ŷ(x 1 ) =ŷ(x 2 ); andv(x 1 ) =v(x 2 ): From (3.17) and (3.11), one hasv
Since (x 1 ) = (x 2 ) implies 0 (x) = 0 for almost all x 2 [x 1 ; x 2 ]; it follows that (x 1 ) = (x 2 ) impliesv(x 1 ) =v(x 2 ): By standard arguments, 15 it follows that there exists a function v such thatv(x) = v( (x)) for all x:
Next, consider the function w such that
for all t; wherex is distributed as G: By the de…nition of the conditional expectation, one has
Given w ; consider also the function y such that u(w (t); y (t); t) = v(t) (3.22) for all t: By the de…nition of v; one also has
for all x: By the strict quasi-concavity of u; (3.22), (3.20) and (3.23) imply
Moreover, the inequality in (3.25) is strict unless one has w ( (x)) =ŵ(x) for G-almost all x: If the inequality in (3.25) is strict, one has
Given that, trivially, the triple w ; y ;v has y nondecreasing and v = v satisfying (3.16) -(3.18), (3.26) is incompatible with the assumption thatŵ;ŷ;v maximizes (3.15) subject to the constraints thatŷ be nondecreasing and thatv satisfy (3.16) -(3.18). Therefore, the inequality in (3.25) cannot be strict. It follows that w ( (x)) =ŵ(x) and, by (3.22) , y ( (x)) =ŷ(x) for G-almost all x; as claimed in the lemma.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 2 . If contracts are conditioned on x rather than t; the principal has room to o¤er a richer contract menu. In particular, if t is a mass point of the distribution F; the function ( ) is discontinuous at t; and the principal can assign di¤erent contracts to di¤erent pseudotypes x 2 ( (t ); (t)]: Thus, he might o¤er di¤erent contracts (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) for x 2 ( (t ); (t)]; so thatŵ(x) is uniformly distributed between w 1 and w 2 in Figure 2 . However, such an arrangement cannot be optimal for him. Because all pseudotypes x 2 ( (t ); (t)] correspond to the same real type (x) = t; incentive compatibility requires that all the contracts (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) for x 2 ( (t ); (t)] provide the agent of type t with the same utility: Thus, in Figure 1 , the contract o¤ers (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) for x 2 ( (t ); (t)] all lie on the same indi¤erence curve I(t) for type t. Strict quasi-concavity of u implies that the indi¤erence curve I(t) is strictly convex. If the principal replaces the wage o¤ersŵ(x) for x 2 ( (t ); (t)] by their (conditional) expectation w = (w 1 + w 2 )=2; he can ask for an output y that is strictly greater than the (conditional) expectation ofŷ(x); x 2 ( (t ); (t)]: By introducing heterogeneity into the contract o¤ers to people with the same "real" type t; the principal can only harm himself. 
Preliminaries
The principal's modi…ed problem has the same formal structure as the principal's problem itself when F has a density. However, the density g( ) in (3.15) is not, in general, continuous. Moreover, the functionsû;û w ; andû y are not generally continuously di¤erentiable with respect to x: From (3.16), however, one easily veri…es thatû; like u; is twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly quasi-concave in w and y jointly, as well as increasing in w and decreasing in y: In particular, one hasû w (w; y; x) = u w (w; y; (x)) (4. for all w; y, and x: Thus,û inherits the weak single-crossing property from u.
Optimality Conditions
If the functionŷ( ) was known to be absolutely continuous, the principal's modi…ed problem would be a standard control problem withv( ) andŷ
However, this Hamiltonian is not, in general, continuous in x: In particular, if (x) is a mass point of the type distribution F and x 0 < x implies (x 0 ) < (x); the density g( ) will exhibit a discontinuity at x, and so will the Hamiltonian H: If such a discontinuity arises, there is no reason forŷ( ) to be absolutely continuous.
Even so, the principal's modi…ed problem can be handled by control-theoretic methods. In , I formulate a maximum principle for optimal control problems with monotonicity constraints on the controls. When applied to the principal's modi…ed problem, Theorem 3.1 in Hellwig (2008) yields: 
and'
q (x 1 ) = 0: for all x; where c( ; ; ) be de…ned so that for any y and t; c( ; y; t) is the inverse of the section u( ; y; t) of u that is determined by y and t: The modi…ed problem then satis…es the assumptions of and, in addition, the transversality conditions (b) and (d), as well as statements (e) and (f) hold. I also introducê
de…ned so that (4.12) holds. From (4.14) -(4.17), one obtainŝ
for almost all x 2 [x 0 ; x 1 ]: Statements (a) and (c) follow immediately.
In the following, I will suppose thatŵ( );ŷ( ); andv( ) provide a solution to the principal's modi…ed problem, and that^ ( );' v ( ); and' q ( ) are the associated Lagrange multiplier and costate variables.
Given the Inada condition u y (w; 0; t) = 0 for all w and t; one does not have to worry about boundary solutions. Proof. I …rst show thatŷ(x) > 0 for all x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ]: For suppose that this claim is false. Then, becauseŷ( ) is nondecreasing, there exists x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ] such thatŷ(x) = 0 for x 2 [x 0 ; x) andŷ(x) > 0 for x > x: Becauseŷ( ) is strictly increasing at x, statement (f) of Theorem 4.1 yieldŝ
Because u y (w; 0; t) = 0 for all w and t;ŷ(x) = 0 for x 2 [x 0 ; x) also implieŝ
for all x 2 [x 0 ; x): By (4.18), therefore,
for all x 2 (x 0 ; x): By integration, using (4.19), one obtainŝ
Because x > x 0 ; by the de…nitions of G and x 0 ; one has G( x) = F ( ( x)) > 0: Therefore, (4.20) is incompatible with (4.13).The assumption thatŷ(x) = 0 for some x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ] thus leads to a contradiction and must be false. Given thatŷ(x) > 0 for x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ]; the individual-rationality condition u(ŵ(x);ŷ(x); x) 0 also yieldsŵ(x) > 0 for x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ]:
Using (4.6), one can rewrite (4.12) and (4.18) aŝ
and' and distorted upwards from e¢ ciency for x if
The function' v ( ) is given as the solution to the di¤erential equation (4.21) that satis…es the transversality condition' v (x 1 ) = 0: This solution is computed aŝ
(4.31) so that one obtains:
At this point, a standard argument, along the lines of Mirrlees (1971 or Seade (1982) , might go as follows: If there is no pooling of types, so that However, the presumptions that' 0 q (x) = 0 and that the single-crossing condition (4.4) is strict are both not justi…ed. Even if the original single-crossing condition (2.2) is strict, the inequality in (4.4) cannot be strict if (x) is a mass point of the distribution F ( ): Moreover, if (x) is a mass point of the distribution F ( ); it turns out that one must have' 0 q (x) < 0: Given the insu¢ ciency of the traditional argument focussing on the sign of the costate variable' v ( ); the following argument focusses on the costate variable' q ( ) that corresponds to the monotonicity constraint. From (4.24), one …nds that
for any x andx: The following lemma relates the behaviour of' q ( ) to the e¢ ciency properties of the contracts (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)):
i.e., if the monotonicity constraint is binding, there must be a downward distortion from e¢ ciency.
Proof. I …rst show that' q (x 0 ) = 0: Ifŷ(x 0 ) > 0; this follows from the transversality condition (4.10). Ifŷ(x 0 ) = 0; Lemma 4.2 implies that the functionŷ( ) is strictly increasing at x 0 ; in this case,' q (x 0 ) = 0 follows from statement (f) in Theorem 4.1.
Suppose that' q (x) 6 = 0 for somex so that (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is not distorted downwards from e¢ ciency. Since' q (x 0 ) = 0 and' q ( ) is continuous, there exists x 2 [x 0 ;x) such that' q ( x) = 0 and' q (x) 6 = 0 for all x 2 ( x;x]: By statement (f) in Theorem 4.1, one actually has' q (x) < 0 andŷ(x) =ŷ(x) for all x 2 ( x;x]: By (3.17), one also hasŵ(x) =ŵ(x) for all x 2 ( x;x]; i.e., all types t with (t) 2 ( x;x] must get the same contract.
By the single-crossing condition (4.4), it follows that, for any x 0 2 ( x;x]; the contract (ŵ(x 0 );ŷ(x 0 )) = (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is not distorted downwards from e¢ ciency for x. By (4.25) -(4.27), it follows that
for all x 0 2 ( x;x]: From (4.32), one therefore obtainŝ
By (4.4) and Lemma 4.3, (4.33) in turn yields' q (x) ' q ( x) 0; which is incompatible with the assumption that' q (x) < 0 and' q ( x) = 0: The assumption that' q (x) 6 = 0 for somex so that (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is not distorted downwards from e¢ ciency has thus led to a contradiction and must be false.
Lemma 4.4 implies that, for any x for which (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is not downward distorted, the term' q (x) in (4.32) vanishes. Because, by (4.13),' q (x) 0, it follows that, for any such x and anyx > x; the left-hand side of (4.32) is nonpositive, and one must have Zx
Sinceû w > 0 andû y 0; this is equivalent to the requirement that 
Moreover, the inequality is strict ifŷ(x 0 ) >ŷ(x):
Proof. Incentive compatibility implies that the functionsŷ( ) andŵ( ) are co-monotonic. Indeed, by (3.16 ) and the incentive compatibility condition (3.17), one must have dŵ(x 00 ) +û ŷ uw dŷ(x 00 ) = 0 for almost all x 00 2 [x 0 ; x 1 ]. By standard calculus, one therefore has Upon combining (4.35) and (4.36), one …nds that, for any x for which (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is not downward distorted, one must have Zx By contrast, the possibility that (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) might be e¢ cient for x cannot be entirely ruled out. The following lemma and its corollary show that, if this is the case, then for any x 0 2 [x; x 1 ]; the contract (ŵ(x 0 );ŷ(x 0 )) must also be e¢ cient for x 0 : Moreover, one must have pooling of all types between (x) and t 1 , the top of the type set. 
for all x 0 2 [x; x): Upon taking limits as x 0 converges to x from below; one obtains jû y (ŵ( x);ŷ( x); xj û w (ŵ( x);ŷ( x); x): By Lemma 4.6, one also has jû y (ŵ( x);ŷ( x); xj û w (ŵ( x);ŷ( x); x): (4.43) follows immediately.
Because the contract (ŵ( x);ŷ( x)) satis…es (4.43), Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 imply that (4.39) must hold for x = x and anyx 2 ( x; x 1 ]; moreover, by (4.43), the …rst term on the right-hand side of (4.39) is zero. Thus, one must have Zx 
Therefore, (4.42) holds for all x 0 2 [ x;x]; contrary to the assumption that (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is distorted downwards from e¢ ciency: The assumption that one can have x 2 [x 0 ; x 1 ) andx 2 [x; x 1 ] such that (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is e¢ cient and (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is distorted downwards from e¢ ciency has thus led to a contradiction. 
for allx 2 [x; x 1 ): By Lemma 4.5, it follows that
for allx 2 [x; x 1 ]; and the inequality is strict ifŷ(x) >ŷ(x): Because Lemma 4.7 implies that the two sides of (4.50) are both equal to one, it follows that y(x) ŷ(x): Henceŷ(x) =ŷ(x), and, by incentive compatibility,ŵ(x) =ŵ(x): This establishes (4.47). (4.48) follows from (4.49) and (4.47).
As a last step on the way towards proving Theorem 2.1, I show that, even if there is no x 2 [x 0 ; x 1 ) for which the contract (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is e¢ cient, yet there is no distortion at the top. Lemma 4.9 For any sequence fx k g that converges to x 1 from below, one has
Proof. Let fx k g be any sequence that converges to x 1 from below. Without loss of generality, one may assume that the sequence is nondecreasing. The contract sequence f(ŵ(x k );ŷ(x k ))g is then also nondecreasing. Because this sequence is bounded by (ŵ(x 1 );ŷ(x 1 )); it must have a limit ( w; y):
Recall that, from the transversality condition (4.11) and the optimality condition (4.13), one has' q (x 1 ) = 0 and' q (x) 0: For any k; therefore, condition (4.32) yields
I claim that, as k ! 1; the left-hand side of this inequality converges to zero. To establish this claim, I …rst observe that, by (4. 31) and (4.4) , the lefthand side of (4.52) is nonnegative. Also, by (4. 31) and (4.4) , the left-hand side of (4.52) can be written in the form
where, for any x and x 0 ;
h(x; x 0 ) :
which converges to zero as k ! 1 and x k converges to x 1 from below. Given that the left-hand side of (4.52) is bounded between zero and (4.53), it must also converge to zero as k ! 1:
By Lemma 4.6, the right-hand side of (4.52) is nonnegative for all k: Because the left-hand side of (4.52) converges to zero, it follows that the right-hand side also converges to zero as k ! 1 and x k converges to x 1 from below. Therefore, one must haveû w ( w; y; x 1 ) +û y ( w; y; x 1 ) u w ( w; y; x 1 ) = 0: (4.56)
The lemma follows immediately.
Proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 2.3
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Given the optimal contract menu (w( ); y( )); let ( w( ); y( )) be the associated strongly equivalent contract menu that is given by Lemmas 2.9 and 2.8, and let v( ) be the associated indirect utility function. Further, letŵ( );ŷ( ); andv( ) be given by (3.2), (3.3), and (3.19). By Proposition 3.2, these functions solve the principal's modi…ed problem. If, for all x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ]; the contract (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is e¢ cient for x, sett = t 0 : Statement (a.1) of the theorem is then trivially true, and statements (a.2) and (b) are moot.
Suppose therefore that the set of x 2 [x 0 ; x 1 ] for which the contract (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is distorted downward from e¢ ciency is nonempty, letx > x 0 be the supremum of this set, and lett = (x). Lemma 4.7 implies that, for x 2 [x 0 ;x); the contract (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) is distorted downward from e¢ ciency. By (3.19) , it follows that, for t 2 [t 0 ;t); the contract ( w( ); y( )) is distorted downward from e¢ ciency. This con…rms statement (b) of the theorem. Statement (a.1) of the theorem follows from Lemma 4.8, statement (a.2) from Lemma 4.9.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Let ( w( ); y( )),t, and t 2 [t 0 ;t) be as speci…ed in the theorem, and letŵ( );ŷ( ) be given by (3.2), (3.3), and (3.19) . Let x = (t) and x = sup t 0 <t (t 0 ): Then (x ) = (x) = t. For any x 0 2 [x ; x]; one has (ŵ(x 0 );ŷ(x 0 )) = ( w(t); y(t)); and, since t <t; the contract (ŵ(x 0 );ŷ(x 0 )) is distorted downward from e¢ ciency for x 0 : For any x 0 2 [x ; x]; one also has 0 (x 0 ) = 0: By (4.3) and (3.8), it follows that
and for all x 0 2 [x ; x]: By (4.24) and the fact that (ŵ(x 0 );ŷ(x 0 )) = ( w(t); y(t)) is distorted downward from e¢ ciency, it follows that'
; it follows that' q (x) < 0 and, hence, that ' q (x 00 ) < 0 for any x 00 > x that is su¢ ciently close to x: Therefore, there exists x > x such that (ŵ(x 0 );ŷ(x 0 )) = (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) = ( w(t); y(t)) for all x 0 2 (x ; x): Set t = ( x): Because x > x; one must have t > t: Since (ŵ(x 0 );ŷ(x 0 )) = ( w(t); y(t)) is distorted downward from e¢ ciency for all x 0 2 (x ; x); one must also have t t :
Proofs of Propositions 2.4, 2.5, 2.6
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Let t and t be as speci…ed in the proposition. By Theorem 2.3, there exists t 2 (t;t) such that the functions w( ); y( ) are constant on (t; t): If t= t 0 ; there is nothing to prove. Suppose therefore that t> t 0 and that the contract menu ( w( ); y( )) is continuous at t: Let (ŵ( );ŷ( )) be the associated solution to the principal's modi…ed problem, and let x := (t) and x := ( t): The constancy of ( w( ); y( )) on (t; t) implies that (ŵ( );ŷ( )) is constant on (x ; x): The continuity of ( w( ); y( )) at t implies that (ŵ( );ŷ( )) is continuous at x : If (ŵ;ŷ) is the common value of (ŵ( );ŷ( )) on (x ; x); then, by the de…nitions of x and t; one has (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) (ŵ;ŷ) for x <x : By statement (f) in Theorem 4.1, it follows that' q (x ) = 0: One must also have' q (x k ) = 0 for all k along some sequence fx k g that converges to x from below. For suppose that' q (x) < 0 for all x below x and su¢ ciently close to x . Then (ŵ( );ŷ( )) must be constant on an interval which has x as its supremum. Given that (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) (ŵ;ŷ) for x <x; this would contradict the continuity of (ŵ( );ŷ( )) atx:
Given that' q (x k ) = 0 for all k along some sequence fx k g that converges to x from below, one must also have' 0 q ( k ) 0 for all k along some sequence f k g that converges to x from below. By (4.24) and the de…nition (3.11) of the functionû; one then has
for all k; where u k y ; u k w ; etc. are all evaluated at (ŵ( k );ŷ( k ); ( k )): Without loss of generality, one may suppose that, for any k; at ( k ); the distribution function F has a derivative. The value of this derivative is f a ( ( k )): By Lemma 3.1, one then has
for all k: Thus, (4.57) implies that
for all k. Upon taking limits as k goes out of bounds, using the presumed continuity of (ŵ( );ŷ( )) at x ; one infers that
where f a := lim k!1 f a ( ( k )); this limit exists because f a ( ) is a nondecreasing function.
Without loss of generality, one may also suppose that x is the supremum of the set on which (ŵ( );ŷ( )) takes the value (ŵ;ŷ): Thus, (ŵ( );ŷ( )) is strictly increasing at x: Therefore,' q ( x) = 0: By statement (f) in Theorem 4.1, it follows that' q is maximal at x: Therefore, there exists (a nonnull set of) < x; close to x such that' 0 q ( ) 0: Because t <t; Theorem 2.1 implies that u w (ŵ;ŷ; (x )) + u y (ŵ;ŷ; (x )) > 0: By the single-crossing condition, it follows that u w (ŵ;ŷ; ( )) + u y (ŵ;ŷ; ( )) > 0 for close to x: By (4.24), therefore, ' 0 q ( ) 0 implies 0 ( ) > 0 so that, at ( ), the type distribution F again has a density, with the value f a ( ( )): Upon using (4.24), (3.11); and Lemma 3.1, as before, one infers that
By (4.21) and the fact that (ŵ(x);ŷ(x)) = (ŵ;ŷ) for all x 2 (x ; ), one also has' v ( )u w (ŵ;ŷ; ( )) >' v (x )u w (ŵ;ŷ; (x )): Since ( ) > ( k ) for all k and f a is a nondecreasing function, one also has f a ( ( )) f a ( ( k )) for all k and, therefore, f a ( ( )) f a : Because, by Lemma 4.3, ' v 
By the log-convexity of juy(w;y;t)j uw(w;y;t) in t; one also has u w (ŵ;ŷ; ( )) ju y (ŵ;ŷ; ( ))j 
Thus, u w (ŵ;ŷ; ( )) ju y (ŵ;ŷ; ( ))j 1 < u w (ŵ;ŷ; (x )) ju y (ŵ;ŷ; (x ))j 1; (4.63)
which is incompatible with the single-crossing condition. The assumption that t > t 0 and that the contract menu (w( ); y( )) is continuous att has thus led to a contradiction and must be false. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.4.
Proof of Proposition 2.5 (Sketch).
The argument is similar to the one in the proof of Proposition 2.4: If there were a pooling interval [t; t]; the costate variable' q ( ) would have to be nonincreasing just above x = (t) and nondecreasing just below x = ( t): If the type distribution has no singular component, one has 0 (x) = 1=(1 + f ( (x))) for all x: By the same reasoning as before, therefore,' 0 q (x +) 0 and' 0 q ( x ) 0 would yield (4.59) and (4.60), with f a and f a ( ( )) replaced by f (t) = f ( (x )) and f ( t) = f ( ( x)): With strict positivity and monotonicity of f and with log-convexity of juy(w;y;t)j uw(w;y;t) in t; one then again obtains (4.63). Because this is incompatible with the single-crossing condition, the assumption that there is a pooling interval must be false.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Proceeding indirectly, suppose that the proposition is false. Then there is an optimal contract menu (w( ); y( )) that exhibits a discontinuity at some t 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ]: If (ŵ( );ŷ( )) is the associated solution to the principal's modi…ed problem, then (ŵ( );ŷ( )) exhibits a discontinuity at x = ( t): Then (ŵ( );ŷ( )) is strictly increasing at x: This implies' q ( x) = 0: By statement (f) in Theorem 4.1, it follows that' q is maximal at x: Therefore there exist sequences f k g converging to x from below and f `g converging to x from above such that' 0 for all k and`: By (4.24), one then has'
and' ; ( `) ). Because the type distribution has a continuous density, Lemma 3.1, yields
for all x: Conditions (4.64) and (4.65) can therefore be rewritten aŝ
Upon taking limits as k and`become large, using the continuity of f and and the monotonicity of the contract menu, one obtainŝ
Because u is strictly quasi-concave in w and y; (ŵ( x+);ŷ( x+)) (ŵ( x );ŷ( x )) implies that the right-hand side of (4.68) is strictly greater than the right-hand side of (4.69). Because'
f ( ( x)) < 0 and ju y j = u y ; it follows that
or, equivalently,
where " " and "+" in the arguments stand in for evaluation at (ŵ( x );ŷ( x ); ( x)) and (ŵ( x+);ŷ( x+); ( x)): However, since IC implies
one easily veri…es that (4.70) is incompatible with the convexity of the function y ! u t (c(v; y; ( x)); y; ( x)). The assumption that the proposition is false has thus led to a contradiction.
Lemma 3 Let t; t; and (w; y); ( w; y) be such that t > t; y < y; u(w; y; t) u( w; y; t)
and u( w; y; t) u(w; y; t):
Then u( w; y; t 0 ) = u(w; y; t 0 )
for all t 0 2 [t; t]; i.e., all types between t and t are indi¤ erent between the contracts (w; y) and ( w; y):
Proof. By Lemma 2, y > y and (4) imply u(w + "; y; t 0 ) > u( w; y; t 0 ) for all t 0 2 [t; t] and all " > 0; hence, u(w; y; t 0 ) u( w; y; t 0 )
for all t 0 2 [t; t]: Similarly, y > y and (5) imply u( w; y; t 0 ) u(w; y; t 0 )
for all t 0 2 [t; t]: (6) follows immediately.
Lemma 4 A contract menu (w( ); y( )) that is de…ned on a set X [t 0 ; t 1 ] is incentive-compatible on X if and only if, for any t 2 X and t 2 X such that (t ; t)\X = ;; there exists an extension of (w( ); y( )) to X[(t ; t) that is incentivecompatible on X [ (t ; t).
Proof. The "if"-part of the lemma is trivial. To prove the "only if"-part, let X [t 0 ; t 1 ] and suppose that (w( ); y( )) is incentive-compatible on X: Let t2 X and t 2 X be such that (t; t)\X = ;: Incentive compatibility of (w( ); y( )) on X implies that u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w( t); y( t); t) (9) and u(w( t); y( t); t) u(w(t); y(t); t):
Because u is continuous, there existst 2 [t; t] such that u(w(t); y(t);t) = u(w( t); y( t);t):
Extend w( ) and y( ) to the interval (t; t) by setting (w(t); y(t)) = (w(t); y(t)) for t 2 (t;t);
(w(t); y(t)) = (w( t); y( t)) for t 2 (t; t);
and (w(t); y(t)) = (w( t); y( t)) ift > t: (14) To prove that the extended contract menu is incentive-compatible, I …rst note that, if y( t) y(t); then Lemma 2 and (11) imply u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w( t); y( t); t)
for all t 2 (t;t] and u(w( t); y( t); t) u(w(t); y(t); t)
for all t 2 [t; t]: If y( t) < y(t); these same inequalities follow from Lemma 3; indeed, in this case, (15) and (16) 
for t 2 [t; t] and t 0 2 X satisfying y(t 0 ) y(t): Incentive compatibility of (w( ); y( )) on X implies that u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w(t 0 ); y(t 0 ); t) (18) for all t 0 2 X \ [t 0 ;t). By Lemma 2, it follows that u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w(t 0 ); y(t 0 ); t)
for all t 2 [t; t]: By (12) - (14) and (15), it follows that u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w(t 0 ); y(t 0 ); t):
A precisely symmetric argument shows that (20) must also hold for t 2 [t; t] and t 0 2 X satisfying y(t 0 ) y( t): For t 0 2 X satisfying y(t) < y(t 0 ) < y( t); Lemma 3 implies that u(w(t); y(t); t) = u(w(t 0 ); y(t 0 ); t)
if t 0 <t, and u(w( t); y( t); t) = u(w(t); y(t); t)
if t 0 > t: In either case, one again obtains (20) for all t 2 [t; t]: For t 2 X and t 0 2 X [ (t; t); the validity of (17) follows trivially from the incentive compatibility of (w( ); y( )) on X and the observation that the extension of the domain of the contract menu to X [ (t; t) has not changed its range.
Proof of Lemma 1. The "if" part of the lemma is trivial. To prove the "only if" part, observe that the set [t 0 ; t 1 ]nT can be represented as a countable union of open intervals I 1 ; I 2 ; ::: If one applies Lemma 4 successively, with X 1 = T; (t 1 ; t 1 ) = I 1 ; X 2 = T [ I 1 ; (t 2 ; t 2 ) = I 2 ; etc., then, in the limit, one obtains an extension of (w( ); y( )) that is incentive compatible on [t 0 ; t 1 ]:
To prove that this extended contract menu is also individually rational, one notes that, because t 0 2 T; the contract (w(t 0 ); y(t 0 )) that is assigned to the lowest type has not been changed. By the individual rationality of the original contract menu, u(w(t 0 ); y(t 0 ); t 0 ) 0 = u(0; 0; t 0 ): By Lemma 2, it follows that u(w(t 0 ); y(t 0 ); t) u(0; 0; t) = 0 for any t > t 0 : By incentive compatibility, one also has u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w(t 0 ); y(t 0 ); t); hence, u(w(t); y(t); t) 0: 
for t 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ] and, moreover, v(t 0 ) 0:
As mentioned in the text, Lemma 5 is little more than a slight generalization of the characterization result in .
Lemma 6
If a contract menu (w( ); y( )) is nondecreasing and incentive-compatible on [t 0 ; t 1 ]; then the induced indirect utility function v( ) satis…es
Proof. The argument follows Baron and Myerson (1982) . For any t and t; incentive compatibility implies v(t) = u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w( t); y( t); t)
and v( t) = u(w( t); y( t); t) u(w(t); y(t); t):
From (26) and (27), one obtains u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w(t); y(t); t) v(t) v( t) u(w( t); y( t); t) u(w( t); y( t); t);
Because u t ( ; ; ) is continuous and, by monotonicity, the triples (w(t); y(t); ) and (w( t); y( t); ) belong to the compact set If t is a continuity point of the contract menu (w( ); y( )) and if t is close to t; then, by standard arguments, the right-hand side and the left-hand side of (29) are both approximately equal to u t (w(t); y(t); t): In this case, the (ordinary) derivative of v( ) at t exists and is equal to u t (w(t); y(t); t): Because the nondecreasing function t ! (w(t); y(t)) has at most countably many points of discontinuity, it follows that the function t ! u t (w(t); y(t); t) is a RadonNikodym derivative for the absolutely continuous function v( ): The validity of (25) 
for all t; t; and between t and t:
The single-crossing condition implies that u w (w( ); y( ); ) ju y (w( ); y( ); )j Q u w (w( ); y( ); t) ju y (w( ); y( ); t)j as Q t;
hence, since u y takes negative values, u y (w( ); y( ); ) u w (w( ); y( ); ) Q u y (w( ); y( ); t) u w (w( ); y( ); t) as Q t:
Because u w takes positive values and y( ) is nondecreasing, (34) and (35) imply that Z t t u w (w( ); y( ); t)dw( ) + Z t t u y (w( ); y( ); t)dy( ) 0
for all t and t: Therefore, u(w(t); y(t); t) u(w( t); y( t); t) 0
for all t and t:
Lemma 8 A contract menu (w( ); y( )) that is incentive-compatible on an interval [t 0 ; t 1 ] has induced utility satisfying v(t) 0 if and only if v(t 0 ) 0:
Proof. It su¢ ces to observe that, by (25) , v( ) is a nondecreasing function.
Lemma 5 follows from Lemmas 6 -8.
3 Proof of Lemma 2.9
Lemma 9 (Lemma 2.9) For any incentive-compatible contract menu (w( ); y( )), there exists a nondecreasing incentive-compatible contract menu ( w( ); y( )) that provides the agent with the same payo¤ v(t) = u(w(t); y(t); t) for all t and that satis…es Z [ y(t) w(t)]dF (t) Z [y(t) w(t)]dF (t);
moreover, the inequality in (38) is strict unless the contract menus (w( ); y( )) and ( w( ); y( )) are equivalent.
To prove this lemma, I need a stronger version of Lemma 3. The following result implies that, if an incentive-compatible contract menu violates monotonicity, then, in the relevant part of their domains, the indi¤erence curves of the relevant types must coincide.
Lemma 10 If any two types t and t are both indi¤ erent between two contracts (w; y) and ( w; y) << (w; y); then, between these two contracts, their indi¤ erence curves coincide, i.e., for any (w 0 ; y 0 ) with ( w; y) (w 0 ; y 0 ) (w; y); u(w 0 ; y 0 ; t) = u(w; y; t) if and only if u(w 0 ; y 0 ; t) = u( w; y; t):
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Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that t t: If ( w; y) (w 0 ; y 0 ) (w; y); then, by Lemma 2, u(w 0 ; y 0 ; t) = u(w; y; t)
implies u(w 0 ; y 0 + "; t) < u(w; y; t) for all " > 0; hence, u(w 0 ; y 0 ; t) u(w; y; t):
Because type t is indi¤erent between (w; y) and ( w; y) and because ( w; y) (w 0 ; y 0 ); by Lemma 2, (40) also implies u(w 0 + "; y 0 ; t) > u( w; y; t) for all " > 0; hence, u(w 0 ; y 0 ; t) u( w; y; t):
Because type t is also indi¤erent between (w; y) and ( w; y); (41) and (42) imply u(w 0 ; y 0 ; t) = u( w; y; t):
Thus, (40) implies (43). By a precisely symmetric argument, one also …nds that (43) implies (40).
To proceed with the proof of Lemma 9 itself, I need some additional notation. Given an incentive-compatible contract menu (w( ); y( )) with associated indirect utility function v( ); for any t; let I(t) = f t 2 T ju(w( t); y( t); t) = v(t) and u(w(t); y(t); t) = v( t)g
be the set of types t such that both t and t are indi¤erent between the pairs (w(t); y(t)) and (w( t); y( t)): By Lemma 3, we know that, for any t; the set I(t) contains any t > t for which y( t) < y(t); indeed, if such t exists, the set I(t) has the entire interval [t; t] as a subset: By Lemmas 3 and 10 jointly, in this case, the set I(t) also contains any t 0 < t for which y(t 0 ) y( t); indeed, it has the entire interval [t 0 ; t] as a subset. Given the set I(t); let (t) := f(w; y)ju(w; y; t) = v(t) and y(t 0 ) y y(t 00 ) for some t 0 ; t 00 2 I(t)g (45) be the segment of type t's indi¤erence curve through (w(t); y(t)) that lies "between" the contracts assigned to types in I(t); and let (t) be the closure of (t): Any contract (w; y) in (t) provides type t with the same utility v(t) as the contract (w(t); y(t)): It is therefore of interest to ask which of these contracts is most pro…table for the principal. 
has a unique solution ( w(t); y(t)): The contract menu ( w( ); y( )) is nondecreasing and incentive-compatible.
Proof. Uniqueness of the solution to the problem max (w;y)2 (t) [y w] follows from the strict quasi-concavity of u in w and y: To prove weak monotonicity, suppose that t < t and y(t) > y( t): By Lemma 3, one has t 2 I(t). By the de…nition of I( ); it follows that I(t) = I( t): By Lemma 10, one then also has (t) = ( t); hence (t) = ( t). Because the solution to problem (46) is unique and depends on t only through the constraint set (t); it follows that ( w(t); y(t)) = ( w( t); y( t)): The assumption that t < t and y(t) > y( t) has thus led to a contradiction and must be false. Thus t < t implies y(t) y( t). Weak monotonicity of w( ) then follows from incentive compatibility.
By construction, u( w(t); y(t); t) = v(t)
for all t: To prove incentive compatibility, it therefore su¢ ces to show that v(t) u( w( t); y( t); t)
for all t and all t: Since ( w( t); y( t)) 2 ( t); there exists a sequence f(w k ( t); y k ( t))g of elements of ( t) that converges to ( w(t); y(t)): To prove (48), it therefore suf…ces to show that v(t) u(w k ( t); y k ( t); t)
for all k: By the de…nition of ( t); there exist sequences f t 
which also yields (49).
To establish Lemma 9, it now su¢ ces to observe that, by construction, one has y(t) w(t) y(t) w(t)
for all t; and that the inequality in (55) is strict unless (w(t); y(t)) = ( w(t); y(t)):
